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273 
APPLICATION OF U.S. STATUS OF FORCES 
AGREEMENTS TO ARTICLE 98 OF THE  
ROME STATUTE 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) represents the culmination of 
decades of work toward an independent standing international court 
capable of prosecuting and trying the most heinous of all international 
criminals.1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute or Statute),2 created out of the legacy of Nuremberg,3 Tokyo,4 the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)5 and 
 
 
 1. See Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal Court Treaty: 
Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 
Jan.-Mar. 1999, at 1 (discussing the origins, organization of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court and other events leading up to the creation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court); see Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: 
From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-49 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl 
Kaysen eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT]. 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 
279. Prior to the defeat of German in World War II, the allied powers of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Russia pledged to punish war criminals. This pledge manifested itself in a signed joint 
determination to hold Germans individually responsible for crimes committed by them during the 
course of the war. Following the war, on August 8, 1945, these three powers with the addition of 
France signed the London Agreement, providing for the establishment of an ad hoc Military Tribunal 
to prosecute and punish the major war criminals of the European Axis. This agreement contained the 
charter of the International Military Tribunal. Nineteen other nations subscribed to the principles of the 
Charter, and a common indictment for twenty-three nations was presented at Nuremberg. 
 Under the Charter, the Tribunal asserted jurisdiction over individuals who committed Crimes 
Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. Official position or the orders of a 
superior would not be considered proper defenses. For a full description of the Tribunal see WHITNEY 
R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL (1999). 
 4. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. I, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27). Unlike the multinational cooperation 
creating the charter for Nuremberg, the Tokyo Charter was an executive decree of General Douglas 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the allied powers in Japan acting under orders from the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other allied powers were consulted only after the Charter had been 
issued and because the Nuremberg Charter had already been negotiated few changes were made to the 
revised Tokyo Charter. Under the Charter, the Tribunal held jurisdiction over crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Official position or the orders of a superior would not be 
considered proper defenses. 
 For a full description of the Tribunal, see Richard H. Minear, Victors Justice, The Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial (1971) and Tim Maga, Judgment at Tokyo, The Japanese War Crimes Trials (2001). 
 5. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), S.C. Res. 1166, 
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the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),6 governs and 
authorizes the establishment of the ICC. During a month-long process in 
1998,7 representatives of 160 countries, assisted by more than 250 
nongovernmental agencies,8 negotiated the Statute.9 One hundred and 
thirty-nine states signed the Statute and as of November 19, 2002, eighty-
four states have ratified it.10 The Rome Statute came into effect11 on April 
11, 200212 and entered into force13 on July 1, 2002.14 
Although the United States supports the ideals embodied in the Rome 
Statute, it is determined to obtain an exemption from the Court’s 
jurisdiction for members of its armed forces and officials.15 During the 
closing hours of the Rome Conference, delegates overwhelmingly voted 
down U.S. amendments to the Statute to secure this exemption.16 The 
United States feels vulnerable to political attack through the Court because 
of its military deployment across the globe and its international role as 
peacekeeper.17 Accordingly, U.S. policymakers18 and the Department of 
 
 
Un.N. SCOR, 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998), S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 4240th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000). 
 6. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994). 
 7. Id. at 383. 
 8. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J., 381, 383 (2000). 
 9. This process occurred during the “United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,” also known as the Rome 
Conference (Rome Conference). 
 10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ 
index.html (Dec. 3, 2002). 
 11. The Statute provides for its entry into force sixty days after sixty states have ratified or 
acceded to it. When the sixtieth instrument of ratification was deposited with the Secretary General on 
April 11, 2002, the Statute came into effect. 
 12. Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 13. “Entry into Force” is the point in time when a treaty becomes binding between the parties 
that have ratified or acceded to it. JAMES R. FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992).  
“Entry into Force” is defined in Article 126 of the Statute. 
 14. See Tom Hundley, It’s U.S. vs. World on Global Tribunal; Bush Firm on War Crimes Court, 
CHI. TRIB., July 3, 2002, at 1. 
 15. See Sarah B. Sewall et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court: An 
Overview, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 2. 
 16. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1, 26 n.135 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 
1998). In the words of a reporter covering the conference, “As delegates clapped, cheered, hugged and 
took snapshots to commemorate the moment, dejected members of the United States delegation sat 
stonily in their seats.” Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord Is Reached on War-Crime Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1998, at A3. 
 17. See Sewall et al., supra note 15, at 35.  
Concerns about Americans being tried by the ICC flowed from an underlying fear that the Court 
could become politicized, used by hostile nations as a vehicle for challenging U.S. foreign policy. 
U.S. negotiators sought an exception for the prosecution of Americans . . . U.S. leaders imply that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/12
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Defense19 oppose the Court in its present form and continue to negotiate 
and search for exemptions.20 
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, the U.S. delegation to the 
U.N. Preparatory Commission for the ICC (PrepCom)21 attempted to 
address these concerns22 and shield U.S. military personnel from the 
Court’s jurisdiction. While the fear about use of the ICC for politically 
motivated attacks23 represents a legitimate concern for the world’s lone 
superpower,24 these concerns were incorporated into the negotiation 
process and safeguards were placed into the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure25 to protect U.S. interests. As stated by 
 
 
because the United States is exceptional in international affairs today—assuming a unique 
responsibility for promoting international security—it deserves some exemption from the rules 
applied to other states . . . . 
Id.  
 See also Chimene Keitner, Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and Tribulation in 
Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215, 238 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in 
Rome; America and the International Criminal Court, FOREIGN AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 20. 
 18. See Wedgewood, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that “Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-N.C.) 
has declared war on the ICC for not giving ‘100 percent protection’ from prosecution to American 
GI’s.”). 
 19. “Because the Statute as drafted did not guarantee that the United States would have 
exclusive—or at least primary—jurisdiction to try alleged war crimes committed by American 
Servicemembers, the United States—under strong pressure from the Department of Defense—declined 
to sign the treaty.” Robinson O. Everett, American Servicemembers and the ICC, in THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 137. 
 20. For descriptions of the American governmental position on the ICC, see Sadat & Carden, 
supra note 8, at 447; see generally Sewall et al., supra note 15, at 1-31; Keitner, supra note 17, at 232. 
See also David Stoelting et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court, 35 INT’L LAW. 
614 (2001). 
 21. For a discussion of the The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court see, David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course With 
the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 68 (2002). 
 22. David Scheffer observed: 
On the larger issue of overall protection for the U.S. military, however, we finally had to face the 
facts that we were barking up the wrong tree and our military services were not being well-served 
with loosing arguments. I spent many years seeking full immunity for out military forces and their 
civilian leadership in negotiations that quite frankly sometimes seemed the theater of the absurd. 
Ambassador David J. Scheffer, A Negotiators Perspective on the International Criminal Court, 167 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001). 
 23. See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A 
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 68 (Winter 2001). 
 24. “The U.S. military has reason to be wary of an ICC. The concept of allowing a civilian court 
to evaluate what essentially may be professional military judgments runs contrary to the core of the 
U.S. military system.”  William L. Nash, The ICC and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces, in THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 156. For a greater 
discussion on a military perspective of universal jurisdiction and the ICC, see Major L. Smidt, The 
International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. REV. 156 (2001).  
 25. United Nations Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Report of the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Court, Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure 
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Ambassador David Scheffer,26 “[S]hort of one hundred percent protection, 
for which there is no plausible multilateral formula, we successfully 
negotiated into the treaty regime an impressive body of safeguards that 
critics continue to overlook in their zeal to trash the treaty.”27 Among these 
safeguards28 is Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which makes international 
treaty obligations superior to requests or orders from the Court for 
surrender or delivery of a suspect.29  
This Recent Development will compare protections given under Article 
98 of the Rome Statute with current U.S. and multinational Status of 
Forces Agreements (SOFAs).30 Part I discusses the structure and purpose 
of Article 98. Part II discusses the historical development and use of 
SOFAs, particularly the NATO SOFA. Part III offers a legal analysis that 
explores the use of SOFAs protection against ICC jurisdiction. Part IV 
applies this analysis to the U.N. SOFA. Part V examines recent arguments 
and attempts by Congress and the Bush Administration to gain additional 
ICC exemptions that go beyond the protections provided for in SOFAs. I 
conclude that SOFAs are potentially useful tools for states attempting to 
obtain jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel suspected of committing a 
crime that would initially fall under the ICC jurisdiction. However, 
SOFAs in their current form do not provide total protection for states 
trying to use them as a comprehensive prohibition against ICC 
prosecution. 
I. ARTICLE 98 
A major achievement of the U.S. delegation to PrepCom was the 
successful negotiation of Article 98 of the Rome Statute entitled, 
Cooperation With Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to 
Surrender.31 Article 98(2) states:  
 
 
and Evidence, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/docs. 
htm. 
 26. David John Scheffer is the former Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. He was 
nominated by former President William J. Clinton to serve as the head of the U.S. delegation to United 
Nations negotiations for the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. For a more 
expansive definition of his position, see Scheffer, supra note 22, at 1-2 n.1-2. 
 27. Id. at 9. 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98. 
 30. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is a legal arrangement established between the 
United States and a host nation which establishes uniform rules for handling legal matters involving 
U.S. military personnel serving overseas.  
 31. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98(2). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/12
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The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the 
consent of a sending State required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation 
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.32  
Thus, Article 98(2) prevents the Court from requesting the surrender of 
a suspect when such surrender would conflict with other international 
agreements. Examples of these types of agreements include SOFAs and 
extradition treaties.33 
The drafters of Article 98 intended to increase multilateral support for 
the ICC by resolving the dilemma arising from a conflict between a state’s 
international obligations to other states and its duty to respect orders and 
requests from the Court.34 Article 98 places international treaty obligations 
in a position superior to requests or orders from the Court for surrender or 
delivery of a suspect. As a result, states can intentionally create 
international obligations that compete or conflict with the Court’s request 
for surrender for the sole purpose of avoiding its jurisdiction. Effectively, 
Article 98 supports current treaties and allows for the negotiation of future 
treaties or international agreements that would secure a state’s jurisdiction 
over its citizens to supercede ICC jurisdiction.35 Thus, it protects the 
power of states to independently negotiate international treaties concerning 
jurisdiction over certain criminal suspects.  
 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. For a description of the application of Article 98 and SOFAs, see Keitner, supra note 17. 
While I do not agree with the conclusions of Keitner concerning the “common sense reading” of 
Article 98, her analysis on the application of Article 98 is useful. 
 34. Articles 12(1) and 12(2) of the Rome Statute subject the military forces of a State Party to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. “A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction 
of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.” Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12. 
Military Forces of non-state parties would only become subject to the jurisdiction of the Court if they 
were involved in a situation referred to the Prosecutor by a state party, art. 13(a), or by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, art. 13(b), or when the Prosecutor has 
initiated an investigation, art. 31(c). In a situation where a non-state party’s national has been referred 
to the court and an international treaty has been signed between the host state and the sending state, 
art. 98 creates a way for the sending state to obtain custody of the person in question without coming 
into conflict with a request from the ICC for jurisdiction. Id. 
 35. “When the U.S. delegation successfully negotiated the inclusion of Article 98(2) in the Rome 
Treaty we had in mind our own SOFAs and their applicability.” Scheffer, supra note 22, at 17.  
Scheffer acknowledges the arguments concerning protection of U.S. servicemembers under Article 98 
and SOFAs and states, “Perhaps more importantly, even as a non-party, under Article 98(2) we can 
negotiate agreements with other governments that would prevent any Americans being surrendered to 
the ICC from their respective jurisdictions without our consent. As a signatory state, we are now in a 
much stronger position to negotiate such freestanding agreements.” Id. at 18. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This subordination of ICC jurisdiction to national courts and 
international treaties follows the central tenet of “complementarity” found 
throughout the Rome Statute. Although the term “complementarity” is 
never used in the Statute, the Preamble, Article 1, and Article 17 establish 
that the ICC shall exercise its jurisdiction in cases where national legal 
systems are non-existent, refuse to prosecute, or are unable to prosecute 
suspects.36 Complementarity thus preserves the sovereign right of states to 
prosecute criminals within their jurisdiction without external 
interference,37 while preserving a jurisdictional “safety net” through the 
ICC when no proper prosecutorial fora exist.38 Throughout the Statute, 
PrepCom provided for complementarity in order to protect national 
sovereignty and provide a check on any overreaching power of the 
Court.39 
Article 98’s requirement that the ICC defer to conflicting international 
agreements both weakens and strengthens the Court. Restrictions on the 
Court’s ability to request surrenders constrains its jurisdictional reach. Not 
only will the Court be subordinate to national legal systems through 
complementarity, but it will also be subordinate to conflicting 
international agreements that prevent the surrender of suspects.40 
Inherently, this restriction lessens the Court’s ability to obtain suspects for 
trial. It also limits the ability of an international court to try suspects who 
have committed such heinous crimes, that only a trial on the international 
level will satisfy victims’ pleas for justice.41 
At the same time, Article 98’s deference to conflicting international 
agreements strengthens the Court’s legitimacy. Unlike the ICTY42 and the 
 
 
 36. For a description of the history and applicability of the complimentarity principle, see 
Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complimentarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001). 
 37. In discussing the negotiations of the Rome Statute Scheffer states,  
We built into the Treaty procedures by which countries with strong legal systems can investigate 
and if merited, prosecute their own citizens and thus require the court to back off. The principle of 
complimentarity, or primary deferral to national courts, is an extraordinary and somewhat 
complex protective mechanism that manifests itself in the Treaty and in the supplemental 
documents. Much of the complimentarity regime originated with us and we prevailed in its 
adoption. Indeed, in some circumstances the Rome Treaty regime offers military personnel greater 
protection from foreign prosecution than do current law and practice. 
Scheffer, supra note 22, at 12. 
 38. THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 73. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 98(2). 
 41. See Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal 
Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 51-
60. 
 42. Res. 827, supra note 5; Res. 1166, supra note 4; Res. 1329, supra note 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/12
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ICTR,43 which derive jurisdiction and legitimacy from the Security 
Council powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,44 the ICC derives 
its legitimacy and authority from a treaty negotiated by sovereign and 
equal states.45 The ICC’s premised theory of universal jurisdiction 
“derives from the idea that when criminal activity rises to a certain level of 
harm, or sufficiently important interests of international society are 
threatened, all States may apply their laws to the act.”46 If a new treaty was 
imposed to require Court primacy over national legal systems and pre-
existing treaty obligations, sovereignty rights would be violated,47 
resulting in weak support for the Court and the refusal of states to 
surrender suspects for trial. Complementarity, therefore, recognizes 
individual state sovereignty while at the same time preserving the ICC’s 
global jurisdiction.  
In sum, Article 98 facilitates negotiation and ratification of future 
international agreements and limits the Court’s intrusion upon 
international relations. The inherent right of a state to negotiate 
international agreements that increase its ability to obtain criminal 
jurisdiction over its nationals may reduce some opposition to the Court.48 
Although negotiating these agreements will become more difficult as 
nations ratify the Statute, Article 98 serves as a legal and psychological 
confidence building measure for states wishing to preserve and exercise 
their right of first jurisdiction over their nationals and prevent their citizens 
from appearing before the ICC.  
 
 
 43. Res. 955, supra note 6. 
 44. Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, or Acts of Aggression, U.N. CHARTER, reprinted 
in 59 Stat. 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043. 
 45. “Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation.” See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. 
 46. Sadat & Carden, supra note 8, at 407. 
 47. Noting the extraordinary quasi-legislative process of the preparatory commission meetings 
for the ICC, Sadat and Carden state,  
for one of the classic objections to the establishment of an international criminal court has been the 
absence of an international sovereign power. The delegates in Rome, perhaps well aware of this 
unease, were generally quite conservative in crafting the definitions of crimes, and for the most 
part adhered to existing treaties, or in the absence of treaties, fairly well-established principles of 
customary international law. But to the extent the Rome conference was in fact a quasi-legislative 
process by which the international community ‘legislated’ by a non-unanimous vote, the political 
legitimacy of the norms rests not on any classic theory of contract between absolute sovereigns 
(treaty-making) but on some other grounds. From this perspective, it cannot be denied that the 
adoption of the ICC statute represented an extraordinary moment for international law. 
Id. at 389-90. 
 48. See Keitner, supra note 17, at 247. 
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II. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS  
In the decades following World War II, the U.S. military 
establishment’s single-minded mission was to forcefully oppose the spread 
of communism.49 The Cold War forced the United States to deploy its 
troops around the globe50 in order to maintain a strong physical deterrence 
to the Soviet threat.51 It was unclear how customary international law 
would deal with criminal jurisdiction over visiting forces,52 especially the 
problem of concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by visiting 
forces on foreign territory.53 In order to resolve these problems, SOFAs54 
were developed for the express purpose of defining the legal rights and 
responsibilities of military forces stationed on foreign soil.55 SOFAs are 
international agreements between states that create obligations concerning 
the jurisdiction over foreign state’s military or civilian citizen.  
Prior to World War II, customary international law recognized that 
“armed forces [were] organs of the state [that] maintain[ed] them and 
remain[ed] [so] when on the territory of another state.”56 In times of peace, 
when a state has agreed to the presence of visiting troops,57 this theory 
remains true.  
A similar approach is “law of the flag doctrine” as defined by Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon.58 The law of the flag doctrine asserts that a state 
consenting to the entry of foreign armed forces on its territory confers 
upon the sending state total immunity from local jurisdiction.59 Marshall 
 
 
 49. See Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States 
Military, S.C. LAW.,  Aug. 2000, at 23. See also Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: 
U.S. Interests in Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 215, 227 (1999); Horst Kraatz, The NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1990, at 3. 
 50. Arthur C. Bredemeyer, International Agreements: A Primer for the Deploying Judge 
Advocate, 42 A.F. L. REV. 101, 101 (1997).  
 51. JOHN WOODLIFFE, THE PEACETIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNDER 
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1992).  
 52. See Eichelman, supra note 49, at 23. 
 53. See THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
LAW OF VISITING FORCES]; SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).  
 54. See Bredemeyer, supra note 50, at 105 (Colonel Brendemeyer describes SOFA’s as an 
international agreement for defining the status of military forces within the territorial boundaries of 
another country). 
 55. See WOODLIFFE, supra note 51, at 15. 
 56. Id. at 170. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
 59. WOODLIFFE, supra note 51, at 170. Justice Marshall sets forth this proposition in The 
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 139-40.  
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declared that a French military vessel visiting a U.S. port during a time of 
peace did so under the implied promise that the vessel was exempt from 
U.S. jurisdiction and enjoyed sovereign immunity.60 While this doctrine 
has been interpreted from dicta in this case, it is important to note that the 
holding only applies to the narrow context of troops in transit over the 
territory of a state. Therefore, it does not directly apply to the modern 
practice of permanently stationing forces in a foreign country.61  
Juxtaposed to the law of the flag doctrine is the principle of territorial 
sovereignty or territorial supremacy. This principle establishes that a state 
has “exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within a 
territory and prohibit foreign governments from exercising authority in the 
same area without consent.”62 In Wilson v. Girard63 the U.S. Supreme 
Court cited to The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden and held, “a 
sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its 
laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly 
consents to surrender its jurisdiction.” Based on the SOFA signed between 
the United States and Japan after World War II,64 this decision 
demonstrated the amalgamation of the two theories into one theory of 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
During the peacetime period after World War II, many nations, the 
United Kingdom in particular,65 hosted foreign military forces.66 
Customary international law began to reflect the desire of nations to have 
 
 
A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction is, 
where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions. In such case, 
without any express declaration waving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage 
has been granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it would certainly be considered as 
violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be 
defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted 
from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from 
the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the 
exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage therefore implies a 
waver of all jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to 
use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may 
require. 
Id. 
 60. WOODLIFFE, supra note 51, at 191 n.13. 
 61. See id. at 170. 
 62. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 75 
(1997). 
 63. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957). 
 64. See Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of 
the Security Treaty, Sept. 29, 1953, U.S.-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 2848, at 1846. 
 65. See LAZAREFF, supra note 53, at 30. 
 66. Id. at 23. 
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jurisdiction over the crimes committed by foreign forces67 and the 
application of concurrent jurisdiction.68 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military redefined its 
mission.69 This new mission reduced the number of troops stationed 
abroad and used the remaining troops as forward units, deployed in 
emergencies.70 The new “war on terrorism”71 and anti-drug campaign in 
South America72 will also see deployment of U.S. military forces to 
foreign countries acting as military trainers and taking part in military 
actions. 
As the United States becomes more involved in limited peacekeeping 
and humanitarian missions abroad and the stationing of troops in foreign 
countries changes, it is important for the United States to maintain legal 
jurisdiction over its personnel.73 Since the ICC will create another 
jurisdiction for potential legal action, defining the legal status of foreign-
deployed forces will become increasingly important. 
A. NATO SOFA 
The desire to delineate the legal rights and responsibilities of military 
personnel while avoiding many of the jurisdictional problems associated 
with long-term overseas deployment on friendly-nation territory74 was 
partially fulfilled in 1951 with the drafting of the Agreement between the 
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces 
(NATO SOFA).75 In order to maximize American jurisdiction over these 
 
 
 67. Id. at 24. 
 68. “While the idea of concurrent jurisdiction, shared by the host nation and the sending state 
was not new, it appears to have reflected the new interdependency among nations which arose after 
World War II, along with the increasing nationalistic identification of many persons.” LAW OF 
VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 101. 
 69. President Bush declared at West Point: 
Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment must now be replaced by a strategy of 
prevention that enables us to take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst 
threats before they emerge. 
Sam Tanenhaus, Lest We Forget in the Face of Worse to Come, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at B1. 
 70. See Brendemeyer, supra note 50, at 101. 
 71. See Susan Schmidt & Thomas E. Ricks, Pentagon Plans Shift in War on Terror; Special 
Operations Command’s Role to Grow With Covert Approach, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2002, at A1. 
 72. See Scott Wilson, U.S. Seeks Court Immunity for Troops in Colombia, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 
2002, at A22. 
 73. See Bredemeyer, supra note 50, at 102. 
 74. “Except where a deployment to another country is covered by the contemporary and 
conventional laws of armed conflict, the deploying military force cannot operate within the territorial 
boundaries of another country without some sort of legal authority.” Id. at 102.  
 75. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their 
Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792 [hereinafter Agreement]. 
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troops, the U.S. Senate, in its declaration giving advice and consent to the 
ratification of the NATO SOFA,76 adopted on July 15, 1953,77 required a 
compulsory waiver request only when the alleged offender’s commander 
believed “there is danger that the accused will not be protected because of 
the absence or denial of Constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United 
States.”78 From this mandate, the United States established a policy79 to 
secure its own jurisdiction whenever possible in cases where the receiving 
state had the primary right of jurisdiction.80 As of 1997, the United States 
instituted some form of formal SOFA with eighty-seven81 countries and by 
August 2000, the United States arranged for 101 SOFAs with 105 foreign 
countries.82  
The NATO SOFA83 has been the template for subsequent SOFAs.84 
SOFAs with non-NATO countries contain similar provisions to the NATO 
SOFA.85 The almost universal adoption of SOFAs and the recognition of 
concurrent jurisdiction as the international norm for peacetime jurisdiction 
over visiting forces demonstrate the desire of states to maintain their 
territorial sovereignty, yet permit sending states to retain jurisdiction over 
the actions of their forces.86  
 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See JOSEPH M. SNEE & A. KENNETH PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION 17 (1957). 
 78. LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 112. 
 79. “[T]he U.S.—the sending state with the largest number of military forces overseas—has 
consistently pursued policies calculated to reduce the scope of the receiving state’s jurisdiction over 
U.S. service personnel to as narrow an area as possible. In this way, the U.S. seeks to transfer every 
offense into the category of concurrent jurisdiction . . . .” WOODLIFFE, supra note 51, at 177. 
 80. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 112. 
 81. Bredemeyer, supra note 50, at 102 n.27 (citing HQ USAF/JAI SOFA Report (2 June 1997)) 
(on file with author).  
 82. Citing statistics taken from Eichelman, supra note 49, at 23 n.4 (citing the International & 
Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, International 
Negotiation of Agreement Handbook, tab 18 (2000)). I was refused access to this material and am 
unable to verify its contents. 
 83. See Agreement, supra note 75. 
 84. See for example: 
The NATO SOFA represents a widely accepted approach to regulating the status of foreign 
forces. It provides a good compromise between the primacy of the law of the flag and the principle 
of territorial sovereignty. Although these rules are widely used for solving status issues even 
outside NATO, their conventional applicability is limited to stays in the territory of another party. 
Special status of forces agreements or arrangements were concluded by various states in many 
cases, e.g. between the United States and more than eighty states; between France and several 
African states; and between the United Kingdom and other states outside the NATO region (e.g. 
Cyprus, 1960; Belize, 1981; Brunei, 1984; and Kenya, 1985). 
LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 47.  
 85. Agreement, supra note 75. 
 86. “The principle of concurrent jurisdiction reconciles the exigencies of the territorial 
sovereignty with the respect of the immunity of jurisdiction of foreign States. The main characteristic 
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SOFAs govern the relationship between the sending state’s military 
personnel and the receiving state’s legal and governmental structures. 
While these agreements cover necessities such as communications, travel 
and transportation, taxes, and hiring local employees, their most important 
function is the apportionment of criminal jurisdiction between the sending 
and receiving nations.87 This apportionment covers both exclusive and 
concurrent situations. In the absence of these agreements, modern 
international law presumes that receiving states retain peacetime criminal 
jurisdiction over foreign troops within their territory.88 
Key to determining jurisdictional questions89 is Article VII of the 
NATO SOFA,90 which apportions criminal jurisdiction among sending 
nation law, receiving nation law, or both, depending on the nature of the 
offense and the identity of the victim.91 When only the sending state’s law 
is violated, the sending state has the power to exercise sole criminal 
jurisdiction.92 When only the receiving nation’s law is violated, the 
receiving nation has the power to exercise sole criminal jurisdiction.93 
When the laws of both states are violated, paragraph 2(a)94 asserts that the 
sending state retains exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the 
military law of that state; under paragraph 2(b),95 the receiving state has 
exclusive jurisdiction over civilian persons accompanying a military force 
with respect to offenses of the receiving state and law of the sending state. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld this provision and has eliminated U.S. 
military jurisdiction over American dependants and civilians in 
peacetime.96 Since exclusive jurisdiction of the receiving state concerns 
only civilians, the difficulty arises when determining jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by military personnel.97  
 
 
of this type of agreement is that it is concluded between States of comparable social and political 
maturity where the judicial organisation and the legal principles present similar guarantees.”  
LAZAREFF, supra note 53, at 43. 
 87. Id. at 133. 
 88. “A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed 
within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.” Wilson v. 
Girard, 354 U.S. at 529 (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136). 
 89. LAZAREFF, supra note 53, at 128. 
 90. Agreement, supra note 75. 
 91. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 102. 
 92. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII, 1(a). 
 93. Id. art VII, 1(b). 
 94. Id. art VII, 2(a). 
 95. Id. art. VII, 2(b). 
 96. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 7 (1957); Grisham v. 
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
 97. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 110. 
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When a crime violates the laws of both nations, the NATO SOFA 
provides for concurrent criminal jurisdiction.98 When this occurs, the 
receiving state maintains primary jurisdiction, except for offenses 
committed solely against the property or security or member of the 
sending State force,99 or for offenses arising out of any act or omission 
done by a sending state service member in the performance of official 
duty.100 In all other cases, the receiving state has the primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction.101 Simply put, when an actor commits an offense in 
the course of duty or affects solely the property or personnel of the 
sending state, that state has jurisdiction. In all other cases (i.e. when 
personnel are not acting in their official capacity or an offense that does 
not solely affect the property or personnel of his or her sending state) the 
receiving state has jurisdiction.102 The controversy herein arises when 
defining what is an “offense” and what is considered “official duty.”103 
In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, where the receiving state has 
primary jurisdiction, that state has the opportunity relinquish jurisdiction 
through a waiver request from the sending state.104 While this SOFA 
section creates no legal responsibilities,105 it formalizes a process106 by 
which states can request jurisdiction when the primary right lies with the 
receiving state.107 Consistent with the U.S. interest to obtain the broadest 
possible jurisdiction over U.S. military forces,108 the United States has a 
formal policy to enter into bilateral, supplemental agreements to extend 
jurisdiction to the greatest number of cases.109  
 
 
 98. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII, 3. 
 99. Id. art. VII, 3(a)(i). 
 100. Id. art. VII, 3(a)(ii). 
 101. Id. art. VII, 3(b). 
 102. For a description of the intent of the negotiation of the NATO SOFA and the practical 
application of this section please see; SNEE & PYE, supra note 77, at 51. 
 103. For a discussion on the difficulties of resolving these questions, see generally WOODLIFFE, 
supra note 51, at 179. 
 104. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII, 3(c). “The authorities of the State having the primary 
right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities on the other state for a 
waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waivers to be of particular 
importance.” Id. 
 105. In discussing the provisions of some of these bilateral agreements employing administrative 
sanctions against states unwilling to comply with a request for a waiver, Fleck states, “realistically 
speaking, however, this statement is of limited viability, since it is questionable whether the prospect 
of U.S. administrative sanctions will suffice to convince host nation authorities to waive their 
(exclusive) jurisdiction in cases involving other than minor offences.” LAW OF VISITING FORCES, 
supra note 53, at 114. 
 106. See WOODLIFFE, supra note 51, at 182-83. 
 107. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 117. 
 108. See LAZAREFF, supra note 53, at 194. 
 109. Id. at 194. 
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III. ARTICLE 98 & SOFAS 
A SOFA gives the United States a moderate amount of protection for 
its military personnel under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Under Article 
98(2), a SOFA is an international obligation that requires a host state of 
military forces to obtain the cooperation of the sending state in order to 
surrender the suspect to the ICC. Therefore, if a U.S. service member, 
while performing his or her official duty, committed a crime that could be 
prosecuted under the Rome Statute and was covered by a SOFA, the 
United States would maintain jurisdiction over this crime and the 
receiving state would be obliged to hand the suspect over to the Unites 
States for prosecution. Thus, Article 98(2) would preclude this foreign 
court from proceeding with an ICC request for surrender, effectively 
preventing prosecution or investigation.110 
Even in circumstances when primary jurisdiction is unclear, the NATO 
SOFA allows for diplomatic intervention to obtain custody. Article VII, 
3(c) declares that, “the authorities of the State having the primary right 
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of 
the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State 
considers such waiver to be of particular importance.”111 This section 
reflects an earlier trend whereby most countries agree on an ad hoc basis 
to U.S. requests for jurisdiction in cases where it retains no legal claim.112  
In recent years however, countries with claims against U.S. citizens 
have challenged this trend.113 In 2001, at the request of the Japanese 
government, an American soldier was released to Japanese authorities to 
face charges of rape that occurred while he was stationed in Okinawa.114 
This represents one of many incidents that have occurred in Japan, 
creating a political firestorm for both the U.S. and Japanese 
 
 
 110. Rome Statute, supra note 75, art. 17 & 18(2). 
 111. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII, 3(c). 
 112. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 112. 
 113. See John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Steven Lepper, Jurisdiction—NATO Status of Forces 
Agreement—U.S. Servicemen Charged With Criminal Offenses Overseas—European Convention on 
Human Rights, Short v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nos. 13.949, 13.950, exerpted and translated in 
29 I.L.M. 1388 (1990); Andrew Pollack, Rape Case in Japan Turns Harsh Light on U.S. Military, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at A3; “Despite their willingness to give the United States even more 
jurisdiction than was originally contemplated under the SOFA, several European receiving states have 
become increasingly reluctant to allow the United States to exercise any jurisdiction at all over capital 
offenses.” High Court of the Netherlands, Mar. 30, 1990, in International Decisions (Keith Heghet & 
George Katale III eds.), 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 698, 699 (1991). 
 114. Rape Sparks Demand for Review of U.S. Forces Accord, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, July 10, 
2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 6897928.  
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governments.115 Another example is the case of Netherlands v. Short,116 in 
which a U.S. soldier was retained in a Dutch court on charges of murder. 
Pursuant to the NATO SOFA, the Dutch court was reluctant to hand Short 
over to the United States because doing so might subject him to the death 
penalty. Such an action would violate the Dutch court’s responsibilities 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.117 Short was eventually 
released when U.S. authorities informed the Dutch government that the 
death penalty would not apply in his case.118 Other examples include: 
resistance in South Korea to U.S forces;119 an incident in Italy where a 
U.S. Marine pilot, during maneuvers, killed twenty gondola passengers 
when he severed a cable car line at a ski resort;120 and the refusal of the 
Philippines to renew their SOFA with the United States.121 Two more 
examples of SOFA controversies involve the revision of the SOFA with 
Germany and the lack of a SOFA covering U.S. military forces currently 
stationed in Saudi Arabia.122 These examples demonstrate the increased 
desire of countries to assert legal jurisdiction and prosecute crimes 
committed on their soil according to their own laws.  
Pressure from the ICC and the international community further reduces 
the U.S. willingness to agree to jurisdictional requests. The NATO SOFA 
offers a reciprocal agreement among NATO allies in which parties receive 
relatively similar protections for troops stationed in member countries.123 
Therefore, this provides for an amicable agreement between nations to 
cooperate with requests for jurisdictional waivers. On the other hand, all 
 
 
 115. See Adam B. Norman, The Rape Controversy: Is a evision of the Status of Forces Agreement 
with Japan Necessary?, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 717 (1996); Pollack, supra note 113; Edward 
W. Desmond, Garrison Under Siege: Anger Over a Rape Case Involving American Troops Threatens 
to Undermine Security Ties with the U.S., TIME INT’L ED., Oct. 16, 1995. 
 116. 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Parkerson & Lepper, supra note 113; High Court of the Netherlands, supra note 113. 
 119. Chris Karns, South Koreans Continue Protests Against U.S. Forces Stationed on Peninsula, 
PACAF News, AIR FORCE NEWS, May 2, 2001, at http://www2.hickam.af.mil/newsarchive/ 
2001/2001106.htm; Associated Press, New Deal Lets South Korea Detain American Soldiers 
Suspected of Rape, Murder: Accord is Finally Reached After 11 Rounds of Talks Since 1995, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2000, at A9.  
 120. W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, The Incident at Cavalese and Strategic 
Compensation, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 505. 
 121. Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Philippine Bases and Status of Forces Agreement: Lessons 
for the Future, 137 MIL. L. REV. 67 (1992). 
 122. Agreement on the Dahron Air Base, June 18, 1951, U.S.-Saudi Arabia, 2 U.S.T. 1474, 
extended on Apr. 2, 1957, 3 U.S.T. 403. For a discussion of the structure of this agreement see, 
LAZAREFF, supra note 53. 
 123. “Considering that the forces of one Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the 
territory of another Party.” Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the 
Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, pmbl. 
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NATO members except Turkey have ratified the Rome Statute124 and have 
participated in a worldwide campaign to support the Court.125 This support 
indicates a general inclination toward cooperating with the Court once it is 
functioning.126 At the same time, countries may also see their reliance on 
U.S. military protection diminish.127 They may no longer readily defer to 
U.S. requests for jurisdiction in light of internal political pressures and 
changes in external military threats. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically changed U.S. 
military strategy.128 While foreign countries have recently allowed the 
United States to station troops on their soil as part of the U.S. war on 
terrorism,129 it remains to be seen whether or not they will provide 
immunity against ICC jurisdiction in the form of SOFAs. The war on 
terrorism has also exposed a need for access to foreign bases,130 thereby 
shifting some negotiating leverage in favor of the receiving country and 
away from the United States.  
Although nations grant waivers on a case-by-case basis in accord with 
NATO and similar SOFAs, other SOFAs contain blanket waivers. SOFAs 
with Tonga and Philippines,131 as well as the annex to the NATO SOFA 
with the Netherlands, provide that, at the request of the United States, 
these countries will waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction. 
However, when they determine that the case in question is of particular 
importance, nations may revoke the waiver. For example, a situation that 
would warrant transfer of an accused to the ICC would probably constitute 
“particular importance” to the receiving state. The receiving state would 
then exercise its right not to waive and prevent the United States from 
garnering jurisdiction. Article 98 protections would then be inapplicable 
and the United States would resort to alternative means132 of obtaining 
 
 
 124. See Rome Statute, supra note 10. 
 125. Joshua Rozenberg, Vision of Global Crime Court Sees Light of Day at Last, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Mar. 21, 2002, at 21. 
 126. “The early entry into force of the Statute is therefore desirable and the Union is committed to 
making every effort to achieve the required number of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession, as well as contributing to the full implementation of the Rome Statute.” The Counsel of 
the European Union Common Position of June 11, 2001 on the International Criminal Court, 2001/ 
443/CFSP. 
 127. See generally WOODLIFFE, supra note 51.  
 128. See Schmidt & Ricks, supra note 71. 
 129. Vernon Loeb, U.S. Gains a Foothold in Central Asia, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at A3. 
 130. Prime Minister Signs SOFA Allowing for U.S. Troops to Be Stationed in Romania, WORLD 
NEW CONNECTION, Nov. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29879914. 
 131. Christine Herra, What’s in a Name, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Feb. 15, 2002, at 1. 
 132. See Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2000). 
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jurisdiction and preventing transfer of the accused to the ICC. 
Except for offenses committed solely against the property, security, a 
member of the sending state force, or for “offenses arising out of any act 
or omission done in the performance of official duty,”133 SOFAs do not 
provide total protection against foreign jurisdiction. There is a general 
willingness to give the requesting country a waiver, but these waivers are 
not mandatory. “Sympathetic consideration” and instances of “particular 
importance” do not provide a legal basis for obtaining these waivers and 
would not suffice as an Article 98 ironclad “obligation under an 
international agreement” from which a state would be “required” to 
surrender a person.134 Without an international agreement containing 
mandatory language requiring a waiver or a right to primary jurisdiction, 
Article 98 could not be invoked by the United States to prevent the Court 
from requesting a transfer of a U.S. service member. 
IV. UNITED NATIONS SOFA 
On June 30, 2002, the United States vetoed a six-month extension of 
the U.N. peace-keeping mission in Bosnia.135 Because the Bush 
Administration feared that the ICC would unfairly target American 
soldiers for prosecution, it requested blanket immunity for all American 
soldiers serving on U.N. peace-keeping missions.136 This veto blocked a 
resolution supported by thirteen of the fifteen members of the Security 
Council. As a result, members of the Security Council acquiesced to the 
U.S. request and granted all peace-keepers participating in the Bosnia 
mission blanket protection from ICC prosecution.137 Effectively, this 
exemption gives peace-keepers no more protection against ICC 
prosecution than they had before. In the end, the Security Council adopted 
a resolution extending the Bosnian peace-keeping mission,138 but not 
before the United States questioned future U.N. peace-keeping missions.139  
The Model Status of Forces Agreement for peace-keeping operations 
 
 
 133. Agreement, supra note 75, art. VII, 3(a)(i) & (ii).  
 134. For additional situations where SOFAs are not applicable to gain jurisdiction, see generally 
Paust, supra note 132. 
 135. Colum Lynch, Dispute Threatens U.N. Role in Bosnia: U.S. Wields Veto in Clash Over War 
Crimes Court, WASH. POST, July 1, 2002, at A1. 
 136. See Christopher Marquis, U.S. Makes Deals to Skirt World Court: Romania, Israel First to 
Agree to Not Extradite GIs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2002, at 3. 
 137. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1422 (2002). 
 138. S.C. Res. 1423, U.N. SCOR, 4573d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1423 (2002). 
 139. See U.S. Warns Future Missions Affected With No Immunity, HOUSTON CHRON., July 3, 
2002, at 23. 
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adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (U.N. SOFA) provides broader 
sending-state criminal jurisdiction than the NATO SOFA.140 The U.N. 
SOFA “is intended to serve as a basis for the drafting of individual 
agreements to be concluded between the United Nations and countries on 
whose territory peace-keeping operations are deployed.”141 When the 
United Nations becomes involved in peace-keeping missions, it negotiates 
and signs this agreement with the receiving nation on whose territory 
peace-keeping operations are being deployed.142 
The U.N. SOFA gives states providing peace-keeping forces exclusive 
jurisdiction over any criminal offense that may be committed by their 
personnel in the host territory.143 Unlike the NATO SOFA, this provision 
is not limited or subject to exceptions. Maintaining criminal jurisdiction of 
participating states over their forces encourages U.N. members to 
contribute peace-keepers to a U.N. mission in a country where there exists 
an unstable or hostile government.144 This basic and unconditional 
provision gives U.S. troops involved in any U.N. operation greater 
protection under Article 98 than waivers or assignments of jurisdiction 
found in other SOFAs. 
United States forces participating in U.N. actions, therefore, receive 
greater protection from ICC prosecution than in other unilateral military 
actions.145 This protection increases incentives for U.S. participation in 
U.N. missions rather than acting unilaterally or through NATO. Unlike the 
ICTY, which has jurisdiction over U.S. military actions in the former 
Yugoslavia,146 the ICC would be prevented from proceeding with a request 
for surrender of a U.S. service member if the U.N. SOFA protected his or 
her activities. In effect, the ICC creates greater protections against 
surrender and prosecution during peace-keeping operations than current ad 
hoc tribunals. Peace-keepers will be free from ICC prosecution so long as 
their nation of origin investigates and properly prosecutes any potential 
crimes they may have committed. 
 
 
 140. Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations, Report of the Secretary 
General, U.N. Doc. A/45/594, Oct. 9, 1990. 
 141. Id. art. 1. 
 142. “The model is intended to serve as a basis for the drafting of individual agreements to be 
concluded between the United Nations and countries on whose territory peace-keeping operations are 
deployed.” Id. pmbl. 
 143. “Military members of the military component of the United Nations peace-keeping operation 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective participating States in respect of any 
criminal offenses which may be committed by them in the [host state].” Id. art. 6(47)(b). 
 144. See LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 53, at 497. 
 145. See id. at 505. 
 146. See ICTY, supra note 5. 
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V. OTHER AGREEMENTS 
In several cases, the United States has obtained exclusive jurisdiction 
over military personnel from countries where it has been involved in 
humanitarian relief efforts or similar military interventions. These 
agreements have usually been negotiated with countries in dire need of 
U.S. assistance and are willing to sacrifice legal jurisdiction in order to 
obtain economic or military aid. Examples include: an agreement with 
Zaire in 1994, which temporarily gave U.S. military personnel the same 
status as administrative staff of the U.S. Embassy; and a letter signed with 
Haiti in 1994 giving members, including Americans, of a non-U.N. 
multinational force stationed in Haiti the same status as U.N. personnel. 
These agreements were not intended as long-term solutions for peacetime 
troops stationed there. They were devised for specific activities and 
limited in scope. Negotiated on a case by case basis, these agreements 
responded to the necessity for immediate U.S. military involvement. 
Currently the United States is pursuing a policy of negotiating treaties 
with each ICC member state to grant immunity to U.S. military 
personnel.147 While few nations have signed such agreements,148 the Bush 
Administration is intent on continuing such a policy even in the face of 
bitter opposition by the European Union.149 The political success of such a 
policy is questionable, but the signing of such agreements will help ensure 
that U.S. military personnel remain under U.S. jurisdictional control. 
Extradition treaties also present obligations under international 
agreements which comport with Article 98 requirements. An extradition 
treaty negotiated in 1999 with the Republic of Korea contained provisions 
preventing the extradition of U.S. citizens to the ICC and vice versa. 
While this example may become part of a trend of ICC protections in these 
agreements, gaining full coverage under them remains difficult. 
Congressional findings determined that: there are approximately 3,000 
open extradition cases worldwide at any time; the United States signed 
extradition treaties with approximately sixty percent of the world’s 
nations; half of these treaties are out-of-date; and treaties enacted prior to 
the 1970s are ineffective because they do not reflect modern criminal 
 
 
 147. Ben Barber, EU Applicants Told Not to Give U.S. Immunity; World Court’s Writ at Issue, 
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A1. 
 148. See Paul Miller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. from War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at 
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 149. See Barber, supra note 147. 
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justice issues.150 The amendment also called upon the Secretary of State to 
develop a process of negotiating new treaties. If the United States initiates 
this process, ICC protectionist language could be included, but it is 
uncertain whether many nations that have ratified the Rome Statute would 
be amenable to such provisions, let alone in violation of the Rome 
Statute.151  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In their current form, U.S. SOFAs alone provide insufficient protection 
against possible ICC jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel stationed 
abroad. Questions of concurrent jurisdiction and language allowing for 
refusal of U.S. requests for waivers in cases of “particular importance” 
provide escape hatches for countries wishing to hand persons over to the 
ICC. Waivers of jurisdiction are based upon traditions of diplomatic 
agreement and “sympathetic consideration” rather than on rules of law. If 
a state is determined to send the individual to the ICC, current SOFAs 
provide inadequate protection in cases where they do not unequivocally 
determine jurisdiction. 
While SOFAs do not explicitly provide for transfer of individuals to 
other jurisdictions, they do not prohibit such transfers either. Simply 
stated, they give jurisdiction to states in circumstances defined in the 
agreement. They leave open the possibility that Article 98 could not apply 
and a receiving state that has obtained jurisdiction over an individual and 
decides not to try him or her in its national court system could transfer this 
person to the ICC. This state would be under no obligation to waive their 
right to jurisdiction or to not surrender the individual to the ICC. 
Only by obtaining mandatory waivers of jurisdiction in every SOFA 
can the United States gain absolute jurisdictional control over its military 
personnel stationed abroad. Such a policy in the current climate of relative 
global safety and rising European and Chinese political power would most 
likely be futile. Few countries will be willing to concede their right to any 
jurisdiction over stationed U.S. military personnel in their territory. Others 
will be hesitant and unwilling to weaken dramatically the power and 
legitimacy of the ICC. While a worldwide campaign of obtaining SOFAs, 
 
 
 150. See 147 CONG. REC. H.2225 (daily ed. May 16, 2001) (proposed amendment 14 offered by 
Congressman Hyde to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003). 
 151. See Miller, supra note 148. 
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extradition treaties, or similar agreements providing waivers against ICC 
surrender is possible, current legal regimes and the political climate make 
the success of such an undertaking difficult and politically unlikely.  
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